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3ABSTRACT
Cambodia’s current criminal defamation law is an impermissible intrusion of 
Cambodians’ constitutionally guaranteed right to freedom of expression.  The law itself is a 
remnant of the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia.  Moreover it is now being 
used as a tool to silence the government’s political opposition through a weak judiciary system, 
leaving in its wake a democracy afraid to exercise its constitutionally guaranteed rights.  This 
law is an unconstitutional violation for several reasons:  first, it violates the right to freedom of 
expression which is guaranteed in Cambodia’s Constitution.  Secondly, it is incompatible with 
Cambodia’s human rights obligations under the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights. Furthermore, it violates customary international law.  This comment proposes  that the 
Cambodian Parliament pass new a new civil defamation law which denies legal standing to the 
government.  Legal standing should be denied to the government to safeguard against the 
potential abuse of any civil defamation law.
INTRODUCTION
A blanket is spread underneath a large Banyan tree.  An older man sits in the middle of a 
crowd, a typical Khmer scarf wrapped around his neck.  The crowd is gathered around him, 
listening anxiously to the words coming from his mouth.  He speaks quickly, in an almost 
agitated manner, as he does when he speaks about political issues in his country.  He is 
explaining to his audience the benefits of a multi-party democratic system, the advantages of a 
free market of political thought.  The audience listens raptly.  They are villagers and farmers, 
some traveling great distances to hear Kem Sokha speak.  This man is becoming known in the 
countryside for these open discussions.  
4This scene is repeated throughout the countryside in Cambodia.  Kem Sokha hosts these 
functions, which he describes as public forums, approximately once a week.  One specific 
afternoon, an audience asks him about his recent arrest and detention.  He has been charged with
criminal defamation.  The charges stem from the words on a banner which hung above a booth 
sponsored by his organization, the Cambodian Center for Human Rights (CCHR), at an 
International Human Rights Day event.  One farmer talks about his desire to exercise his 
freedom of speech, another woman expresses her fear of political repercussions.  Few are willing 
to give their names.  This latest scene, as described in a recent New York Times article,1 is 
characteristic of CCHR’s public forums.  Kem Sokha, president and founder of CCHR, is one of 
the most outspoken critics of the government in Cambodia.  Evidence of this is the prime 
minister’s recent threat against those attending public forums, where he claimed he did not know 
what would happen to the people who chose to attend.2
Kem Sokha was charged with criminal defamation on two separate occasions in 2005.  
The first time, in March of 2005, Prince Norodom Ranarridh filed charges on the grounds that 
Kem Sokha defamed him on a radio program by making allegations that he was bribed to join 
the prime minister Hun Sen’s party.  The charges were not pursued following a statement by 
Kem Sokha in open court which emphasized the need for public opinion and the constitutional 
provisions which support freedom of expression.3  Kem Sokha was arrested on December 31, 
2005, on further criminal defamation charges.  This time, the charges involved the alleged 
defamation of the prime minister.  Kem Sokha was held in prison for almost three weeks.  
During that time, international criticism was mounting against the prime minister for his role in 
the arrest.  The international community called for his release.  The prime minister released Kem 
5Sokha on bail after those three weeks but the charges still stand as the prime minister claims he 
cannot stop the judicial machinery now that it has instituted charges.  
Kem Sokha risks his freedom and his life in raising questions about Cambodia’s 
democratic processes.  These two sets of defamation charges illustrate the current regime’s fear 
because raising these questions threatens the current regime, making Kem Sokha a target.  He is 
never without one of his ten bodyguards, a constant reminder of the danger of his work in a 
country where political assassinations still occur.  Cambodia is currently at a crossroads because 
its future is so uncertain.  If Cambodia comes out of this era as an emerging democracy, it will be 
because of the courage of Cambodians like Kem Sokha or Dr. Kek Galabru, head of the human 
rights organization LICADHO, who choose to fight the status quo.  Freedom of expression is a 
vital human right, nowhere is it more obvious than here.  Repressive acts that are made public, 
like the recent arrest of Kem Sokha, produce a chilling effect of an unknown magnitude.  When 
people see the consequences of voicing any kind of an opinion contrary to the government, they 
will not dare do so themselves.  As one older woman recently commented at a public forum, 
“You talk about democracy, but how much of a right do the people of Cambodia have to speak 
out?  If we speak out, will we be arrested like Kem Sokha?”4  The chilling effects are much more 
pervasive in a country like Cambodia where the current generation remembers the terrors and 
repression when Angkar, a term which refers to the Khmer Rouge government, ruled.5
Criminal defamation laws greatly impede the goals of a vigorous democracy as a 
democracy is dependent upon an engaged and educated populace.  There is a pressing need for a 
civil defamation law in Cambodia that adequately protects Cambodians’ rights of free expression 
while still respecting the rights of an individual to his or her reputation.  This comment proposes 
6that the proper way to strike a balance between these two competing interests is to abolish the 
criminal penalties for defamation and deny standing to the government in civil defamation suits.  
This comment analyzes a current Cambodian law, UNTAC Article 63.  This law provides 
for criminal punishment if the defendant is convicted of defaming another Cambodian.  A
transitional body, not by the Cambodian government, wrote the law and it should be repealed as 
it is an unconstitutional violation of Article 41 of the Cambodian Constitution.  Additionally,  
UNTAC Article 63 violates Cambodia’s treaty obligations under the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).  Furthermore, criminal defamation laws are inconsistent with 
customary international law.  Multi-lateral treaties and customary international law are indicative 
of a country’s obligations to its citizens in protecting their rights.  UNTAC Article 63 is 
inconsistent with these two guides.
BACKGROUND
Cambodian History
In order to fully understand the context of this comment, it is crucial to be familiar with a 
small portion of Cambodia’s history to be able to analyze the severe implications of a law 
criminalizing defamatory statements in such a fragile democracy.  With the legacy of the once-
mighty Khmer Empire that ruled the entire region, Cambodia has recently been plagued by death 
and the destruction of its country.  
The Khmer Empire once extended over present-day Cambodia, Myanmar, Thailand, 
Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam.6  Angkor Wat, the most grandiose of the temples at Angkor, was 
built by Suryavarman II who ruled in the early twelfth century.7  Today Angkor is regarded as 
one of the modern day mysteries of the world.  Its majestic presence serves as a reminder of the 
prominence of the Khmer Empire and the greatness of the Khmer people.  Cambodians still refer 
7to themselves as the Khmer people, in reference to this magnificent history that remains a source 
of Khmer pride today.  French colonization came to Indochina in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries.  After France colonized present-day southern Vietnam,  Cambodia became a French 
protectorate in 1864.8
In 1941, Prince Norodom Sihanouk, then eighteen years old, was installed by the French 
as King of Cambodia.  After the Japanese occupation during World War II, public resentment of 
the French presence grew because Cambodians, 9 like those in many other colonized countries in 
Southeast Asia, no longer saw the French as a superior form of government since they were 
unable to prevent the Japanese from occupying the country.10  Sihanouk successfully persuaded 
France to grant Cambodia independence in 1953.  People began to think of Sihanouk as the 
“Father of Cambodian Independence.”11 This period, during Sihanouk’s reign, represents the 
only relative tranquility the current generation of Cambodians have experienced.12
Cambodia’s political instability began initially with Lon Nol’s bloodless coup d’etat in 
1970 which wrested power from Prince Sihanouk.13  Lon Nol, as one American military adviser 
related, was a “nuts and bolts” man,14 more concerned with the daily operations of his military 
than the country’s future.  As Lon Nol stated, he did not bother himself with keeping track of the 
financial affairs of state.15  These are interesting words for  the prime minister of a country at 
war, a country dependent upon foreign American military aid for its survival.  
Lon Nol was backed by the United States because the U.S. wanted a friendly government 
in power in Cambodia.  The United States was then entrenched in its war in neighboring 
Vietnam against the North Vietnamese.  A Cambodian government that was understanding of 
U.S. interests in the region was extremely important to the American administration.  Adding to 
U.S. concern, King Sihanouk had previously been supporting the North Vietnamese during the 
8Vietnam War while claiming to be neutral.  Sihanouk believed that his country’s survival 
depended upon this purported neutrality and covert support for the North Vietnamese because he 
believed they would eventually beat the softer Americans.16  Prince Sihanouk had been allowing 
weapons to be imported from China to the coast, to Sihanoukville, and transported over the 
Cambodian border in return for arms for his own military.17  Additionally, Vietcong had been 
hiding in Cambodian enclaves, just over the southern Cambodian-Vietnamese border.  As a 
result, the United States government began bombing the Cambodian border in 1969.18
The country was soon immersed in a civil war between Lon Nol’s U.S. backed 
government and the Khmer Rouge, who were seeking to convert Cambodia into a Communist 
state.  The movement was led by French educated Cambodians who viewed Communism as a 
self-sufficient solution for Cambodia.19 Many Cambodians did not know much about the Khmer 
Rouge but supported this new government in the hopes that it would bring peace.20  The 
American bombings of civilian targets along the Cambodian border created a deep mistrust of 
anything American,21 and as a result many villagers supported the Khmer Rouge.
The war culminated on April 17, 1975 when Khmer Rouge forces entered the capital, 
Phnom Penh, and Lol Non fled to the United States.22  The new Communist government soon 
implemented its plan to agriculturize the country at a rapid speed.  Young soldiers marched the 
people from the cities to the countryside where they then forced them to work in the fields and 
perform other agricultural tasks.23  Pol Pot declared that the “insidious ‘bourgeois’ ideas, 
preferences, and attitudes … that had to be destroyed before socialism could be achieved.”24
Many city dwellers, mostly the educated upper-class, were killed because they were viewed by 
the Khmer Rouge as “internal class enemies,”25 contaminated by the West. 1.7 million 
Cambodians were murdered during the Khmer Rouge period, the killing fields are a testament to 
9this murderous legacy.26  Their bodies were piled on top of one another in enormous mass 
graves, stacks of sun bleached skulls became the world’s image of Cambodia.  Before long, Pol 
Pot’s brutal regime began to turn inward as the revolution was not creating the immediate results 
Pol Pot expected.27  Loyal party members were soon questioned and tortured at the infamous 
prison, Tuol Sleng also known as S-21.28
During the Khmer Rouge period, Cambodia was also embroiled in a border struggle with 
Vietnam.  The border has long been a point of contention between the two countries.  In late 
1977, the Vietnamese attacked a few settlements along the frontier to spur border negotiations 
with the Khmer Rouge government.  However, “it was as if they had poked a beehive with a 
stick,”29 and Cambodia’s leaders “began preparing for a holy war.”30  These actions led to the 
Vietnamese invasion in 1979.  
With the arrival of the Vietnamese, Pol Pot and loyal members of his Khmer Rouge 
government fled into the mountains on the Cambodian-Thai border.31  Pol Pot stayed in the 
mountains until his death in 1998 and factions of the Khmer Rouge still remain there.32
Cambodia was soon christened the People’s Republic of Kampuchea (PRK), a satellite of the 
Vietnamese government in Hanoi.33 One of the emerging political powers during this time 
period was Hun Sen, who is now the current prime minister of Cambodia.34  He initially began as 
a zone commander in the Khmer Rouge, but later defected to Vietnam when the internal purges 
began.35  Vietnam continued to exercise control over Cambodia until its forces withdrew in 1989 
because of its own lack of funding after the fall of the Soviet Union.36
The Agreements on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict37
(“The Paris Agreements”) laid the framework for a new democratic Cambodia.  Many states 
participated in the Agreements, 38 a non-exhaustive list includes Australia, China, France,
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Singapore, Thailand, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom, the United 
States and Vietnam.39  It was an era of immense hope as the United Nations came to Cambodia 
to help launch this new democratic government.  
The United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) faced a difficult 
challenge:  to democratize a country after almost thirty years of civil war coupled with foreign
rule.  UNTAC was ultimately ineffective in demilitarizing the country, many Khmer Rouge 
soldiers continued to control parts of the country.40  UNTAC decided to focus its energy on 
organizing a free election for the country rather than demilitarizing the country as it saw 
demilitarization as an impossible task.41 UNTAC backed off its broad democratization mandate 
in favor of free elections.  However it is clear that elections are only one indicia of a political 
democracy, as one author succinctly described the three basic requirements for a democracy to 
truly exist:
A democracy must meet three basic procedural criteria:  (1) Competitive 
elections must be the route to forming governments.  There must be competitive 
popular elections for the legislature … Fraud and coercion may not determine 
the outcome of democratic elections.  Elections must offer the possibility of 
alternation in power… (2) There must be broad adult citizenship … this has 
meant nearly universal citizenship … (3) Democracies must protect minority 
rights and must ensure respect for basic civil liberties: freedom of the press, 
freedom of speech, the right to habeas corpus, etc.  This dimension is important 
because a regime can hold competitive elections with broad participation, yet in 
the absence of guarantees of civil liberties, it is not fully democratic.42
Cambodia still struggles today to have competitive elections.  The second requirement of 
universal citizenship is largely satisfied in Cambodia as citizenship derives from birth, descent 
from a Cambodian parent, naturalization or marriage to a Cambodian citizen.43  However 
considerable change must be effectuated to enforce the basic civil liberties accorded to 
Cambodians.  The director of Human Rights Watch in Southeast Asia, a prominent human rights 
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organization that monitors the situation in Cambodia, recently stated that he believes Hun Sen is 
effectively running Cambodia as an authoritarian government.44
In addition to the contested elections, another legacy of the UNTAC era is the body of 
law it instituted.  UNTAC faced a difficult task, one it was not prepared for.  It needed to create a 
new body of law during the transitional period as the decade-old PRK law was insufficient.  
Criminal law during the PRK period consisted of Law-Decree #2, “Crimes Against the 
Revolution,” which was a list of prohibited acts.45  UNTAC was unprepared to create a new body 
of laws in Cambodia in order to implement its human rights mandate.46  This remains an on-
going problem with UN peacekeeping missions.  One suggestion entails the creation of off-the-
shelf “justice packages” by the United Nations with pre-written laws reflecting the UN’s human 
rights mandates.  Once established, these packages would be ready for application and could then 
be tweaked as necessary according to each country.47  UN peacekeeping missions have 
implemented laws like Article 63 that do not conform to the treaties advanced by the United 
Nations.  The UNTAC process was “time consuming and resulted in an incomplete set of 
laws.”48  Article 63, most likely drawn from Cambodia’s pre-UNTAC law that was based on 
Vietnamese counterrevolutionary crimes,49 is inconsistent with the ICCPR because it protects the
rights of freedom of expression.50
Article 63 of the UNTAC code lays out Cambodia’s criminal defamation law.  
Cambodia’s basic requirements include a bad faith allegation or imputation of a given fact which 
harms the honor or reputation of an individual.  The person need not be explicitly named but his 
identity must be made evident from the defamatory action.  Article 63 mandates punishment by 
imprisonment of eight days to one year, a fine of one million to ten million riels (approximately 
U.S. $250 to U.S. $2,500) or both.51  An individual may register a complaint with the appropriate 
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prosecutor and petition the court to file a criminal defamation charge against the defendant.  This 
may be done in addition to, not in lieu of, any civil action the individual brings against the 
defendant, further punishing the alleged defamer.
In the 1993 elections, newly organized parties clambered onto the scene to take part in 
the historic elections.  Parties included the Party of Democratic Kampuchea (PDK), the 
Cambodian People’s Party (CPP), Front Uni National pour un Cambodge Indépendant, Neutre, 
Pacifique et Coopératif52 (FUNCINPEC), which translates from French as The National United 
Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful and Cooperative Cambodia, the Buddhist Liberal 
Democratic Party (BLDP) and the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP).53  From this initial group, 
the CPP and FUNCINPEC represent two of the three main political parties today.  Many 
candidates from the CPP were former Khmer Rouge soldiers and/or officials in the Vietnamese-
backed government of the 1980s.  FUNCINPEC represented the royalists.  The period before the 
elections was marred by violence and intimidation, with CPP perpetrating the majority of the 
violence.54  Ultimately, a testament to the freedom of these elections, FUNCINPEC won the 
elections, taking 45.2 percent of the vote while the CPP received 38.6 percent, BLDP 3.7 
percent, the LDP 1.3 percent and the Molinka 1.3 percent.
What transpired next explains much of the current state of Cambodia:  the CPP refused to 
accept the results of the election, and the king, a powerful political figure whom Cambodians 
respect, did not press the issue.  As a result, power was shared between FUNCINPEC and the 
CPP with two prime ministers in what was intended to be a post for one, the winner of the 
election.55  There was a feeling of utter hopelessness that passed over the country, a feeling that 
nothing was going to change.56  At that point, many Cambodians disengaged from the political 
process because the CPP retained power even though they had lost the election.  The democratic 
13
process did not achieve what UNTAC had advertised: free elections.  This failure left a 
devastating legacy on the country.  A democracy is dependent upon an engaged and educated 
populace.  If one’s vote in U.N. monitored elections affects no change, then one must question 
whether subsequent elections make a difference.  The United Nations’ peacekeeping mission 
ultimately had little impact upon the political landscape within Cambodia since the CPP, a party 
of ex-Khmer Rouge cadres and Vietnamese officials, is still the dominant power in Cambodian 
politics.  It has won the past series of elections by sowing fear in the local people.57  One 
particular fear the CPP plays upon is a fear of returning to a state of civil war by threatening 
violence if they do not win an election.  This fear of a civil war lead King Sihanouk to allow the
CPP to share the prime minister position.58  Following the 1993 elections, the 1998 elections and 
the 2003 elections suffered from similar problems of intimidation.
In a move to consolidate his power, Hun Sen orchestrated a coup d’etat in 1997 against 
his co-prime minister through “a systematic campaign of intimidation, torture and summary 
executions.”59  The same year, a grenade was thrown into a peaceful demonstration in downtown 
Phnom Penh organized by the SRP— the main opposition party.  At least sixteen people died 
and 150 more were injured.  Evidence linked Hun Sen’s bodyguards with the attack.60  This 
willingness to resort to violence promised Hun Sen’s success in the 1998 elections.
The 2003 elections, however, were not a landslide for the CPP as the 1998 elections had 
been.  These elections painted similar troubling themes of impunity, intimidation, gift 
distribution and vote-buying.61  The CPP received 47.4 percent of the vote, FUNCINPEC about 
20 percent and the SRP about 20 percent.62  The SRP is a newer political party that encompasses 
most of the opposition to the CPP.  The Cambodian Constitution requires a two-thirds 
parliamentary majority.  This was not possible without an alliance between two of the three
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parties.  The SRP initially formed an alliance with FUNCINPEC, which they called the Alliance 
of Democrats (AD).63  The parties’ agreement included broad democratic mandates as well as
mandated the ouster of Hun Sen.  At the last minute, FUNCINPEC dropped SRP and aligned 
with the CPP.  It was a move that made many suspicious.  Rumors flew that Prince Ranarridh, 
who had made the decision without informing his royalist party, had been, among other things, 
bribed with a helicopter by the prime minister.64  As a result of this political wrangling, the 
Cambodian government came to a standstill for almost a year.  
The Current Situation 
The events following the 1993 elections underscore the fragile state of Cambodian 
democracy today.  It is within this environment of political repression that timorous Cambodians 
take their first steps towards asserting their constitutionally guaranteed rights.65  It is crucial that 
the current UNTAC criminal defamation law be abolished in light of Cambodia’s purported 
dedication to the goals of democracy as seen in its Constitution.  The Cambodian Constitution is 
a beautifully written document but it remains just that, a document, rather than truly reflects the 
contours of the government and the limits upon its power.  The current government, with Hun 
Sen as prime minister, uses the cloth of the Constitution to legitimize its actions to the outside 
world while daily life in Cambodia remains stagnant.  
The murder of Chea Vichea, a prominent labor activist and president of the Free Trade 
Union of Workers of the Kingdom of Cambodia (FTUWKC), in 2004 is indicative of the current 
era of fear as this may have been the work of the government to silence its opposition.66
Although many decried the situation, this frightening tactic ultimately proved effective as 
membership in the union plummeted.67 Following the public outcry over the murder of Chea 
Vichea, the government has refined its tools of oppression.  It now utilizes its weak judiciary to 
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convict opposition members on trumped up charges, with criminal defamation charges among 
the most common.68 Commentators believe that Cambodia’s courts are being used to suppress 
political opposition.69
The Judiciary
Cambodia’s judiciary, as the final arbiter of any UNTAC Article 63 charges, seemingly 
sits in a unique place to judge the merit of claims brought by the government.  This is not the 
case in Cambodia though because the judiciary has not attained any independence from the 
executive branch of the government and remains a highly political office.70 Judges follow party 
directives in making decisions rather than coming to a decision based upon their own legal 
training,71 education is minimal as is training.  Corruption is rampant.72  The Asian Development 
bank, in an October 2000 report, stated that “the Cambodian judiciary does not yet meet 
acceptable standards in terms of independence, capability, and integrity.”73  There is little to 
indicate that anything has changed since this report in 2000.  Most Cambodians view the 
judiciary as an extension of the CPP.  
Cambodians see little use for the judiciary in their daily lives.  If a problem arises in the
village, the aggrieved will approach the village chief or the local party representative asking 
them to resolve the problem rather than turning to the courts.74  The King, the National Assembly 
and the Prime Minister are frequently petitioned by the rich and poor alike to intervene on behalf 
of the supplicant.75  Again, the history of Cambodia teaches a valuable lesson— Cambodia has 
traditionally been a village-based society where the village chief resolves disputes.  During 
Sihanouk’s reign, a legal system based upon the French system was emerging but any hope at a 
transition from this feudal structure to a legal system was suspended when the Khmer Rouge 
took power.  Lawyers were one of the main targets of the search for “internal class enemies.”  
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After the Khmer Rouge period, there were ten legally trained people remaining in the country.76
This utter destruction of the previous legal system created staggering challenges for the 
introduction of a competent, independent judiciary today.
The Ministry of Justice has been a hot political issue since the 1993 elections.  CPP 
officials insisted upon control of the judiciary for fear that there would be an investigation of the 
pre-election murders.77  This control exerted by the Minister of Justice, who historically has had 
a close relationship with the prime minister, over the judiciary has seriously hampered any 
reform efforts.  Most judges have a high school education at best.  Party control over the 
judiciary is a reality in Cambodia and “until the judiciary is released from party control, reform 
will be impossible.”78  Judges know that they must follow party directives in their rulings or risk 
the consequences of doing so.79
The judicial experience underscores a greater issue in Cambodia: ignorance.  The Khmer 
Rouge government valued ignorance, in fact it enabled survival because anyone with an 
education was a target.80  This history leaves substantial obstacles in teaching the power of 
education and knowledge.  Kem Sokha’s public forums in the provinces are designed to educate
rural Cambodians of their rights in this new democracy.
The issues with the judiciary run deep.  The lack of independence of the judiciary from
the executive is troubling.  It is especially ominous when the executive is the plaintiff charging 
an individual with criminal defamation.  When the government wields this control over the 
judiciary, the judiciary cannot be impartial as it must be.  In order to prevent this bias, the 
government must be denied the legal standing to bring any defamation suit, criminal or civil.  
The law must be structured to prevent this potential abuse of power.  The government, a 
transitory body, does not have the same interest in reputation as an individual does.
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Freedom of Expression
Three theories behind free speech illuminate its importance: (1) John Stuart Mill’s theory 
that truth can only be judged in light of a competitive market;81 (2) the theory that free speech is 
an integral aspect of self-fulfillment  and self-expression that otherwise inhibits the growth of an 
individual;82 and (3) the theory that free speech is essential for citizen participation in a 
democracy.83  All three of these theories emphasize the power of free speech as well as illustrate
why freedom of expression is considered a basic human right.
In analyzing the theory that free expression is critical in a democracy, freedom of 
political expression is vital because a democracy depends up on an educated electorate.84  In 
order to cast an educated vote, the people must be aware of what their government is doing.  This 
is one of the reasons why transparency within a government is so important.  Vigorous public 
debate is an integral aspect to an educated populace.  Criminal defamation laws have a profound 
chilling effect on public discourse because people fear the repercussions of expressing their 
opinion.  All truths are not exposed.
The basic premise within a democratic society is that freedom of expression may only be 
restricted when it is necessary for the state to protect an individual’s reputation.85  Greater 
freedom of expression must be granted when that expression involves statements about public 
officials or the government.  Significant weight must be afforded to the state interest in public 
discourse because it is vital to a functioning democracy.86  Likewise, the state does have an 
interest in protecting the rights of the individual.  Any restrictions on freedom of expression can 
only be justified if it can be convincingly established that it is absolutely necessary in a 
democratic society.  A restriction cannot be justified if there is a less restrictive means for 
protecting the legitimate reputation interest.  Nor can it be justified if disproportionate damage is 
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done to the freedom of expression in protecting the individual’s reputation.87 Similarly, criminal 
defamation laws disproportionately damage free speech because the punishment is so extreme.  
Penal detention is an inappropriate remedy because the benefits of protecting this state interest 
cannot outweigh the harm to freedom of expression.  It is even more pressing in a country like 
Cambodia where the government is abusing the criminal defamation laws.  The critical balancing 
test between these competing state interests, the interest in free expression and the interest in 
protecting an individual’s reputation, is not being respected.  As a result, this criminal 
defamation law violates the freedom of Cambodian citizens to express their opinions.
Defamation law is often used as a tool to silence opposition critics by political bodies and 
public figures.88  It is imperative for courts to monitor the use of defamation laws to ensure that 
they do not improperly restrict the freedom of expression because defamation laws cannot be 
justified when their purpose is to prevent the legitimate criticism of public officials89.  A 2003 
report on the state of Cambodia’s political system noted, “[w]hile political parties are allowed to 
function in Cambodia, nevertheless, they are subject to systematic harassment and 
intimidation.”90  This harassment and intimidation is pursued in the government’s abuse of 
criminal defamation charges.
It appears that this is currently happening in Cambodia.  This past year alone, many high 
profile critics of the government were charged with criminal defamation.  In October, radio 
journalist Mom Sonando was arrested on charges of criminal defamation and incitement, as was 
the president of the Cambodian Independent Teachers Association, Rong Chhum.91  In 
December, Sam Rainsy, leader of the Sam Rainsy Party, was convicted, in absentia, of criminal 
defamation.92  Another SRP parliamentarian, Chea Poch, fled the country with Sam Rainsy after 
their parliamentary immunity was stripped.   Chea Poch has been charged with criminal 
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defamation for allegedly accusing the leader of the FUNCINPEC party, Prince Ranarridh, of 
joining the 2003 coalition government with the CPP in exchange for U.S. $30 million from the 
prime minister Hun Sen.93  Hang Sakhorn, editor of a Cambodian newspaper, the Ponleu 
Sarnaki, was arrested in Kompong Speu on December 2, 2005 on charges of criminal 
defamation.94  On December 31, 2005, Kem Sokha, “one of the country’s most prominent and 
outspoken human rights figures”95 and president of CCHR, was arrested on charges of criminal 
defamation.  The very same day Yeng Virak, director of the Community Education Legal Center 
(CELC) was arrested on the same charges.  Five days later, on January 4, 2006, Pa Nguon Teang, 
director of CCHR’s radio program Voice of Democracy, was also arrested on the same charges.96
This long list is only a sample of the arrests that have taken place and only includes prominent 
persons.  If these well-known citizens can be arrested and held, even with the world’s 
condemnation, an ordinary citizen without any connections must undoubtedly be afraid to 
publicly voice his opinion for fear of reprisal.  The government is using Article 63, the criminal 
defamation law, to pursue its own political agenda rather than protect the reputational rights of 
its citizens which is an abuse of the law.  
Defamation
Defamation is a public statement that injures the reputation of another.97  The prima facie 
requirements vary depending upon the country’s individual law but all involve the publication or 
dissemination of the defamatory statement to a third party either negligently or intentionally.98
Additionally, the statement must pertain to this particular individual and it must be a statement 
that a reasonable person would find defamatory.99
Cambodia’s defamation law mandates a criminal punishment which is satisfied by jail 
time, a fine or both.100 To be found guilty of criminal defamation, there must be a bad faith 
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allegation of a fact which harms the honor or reputation of an individual where the individual’s 
identity need not be explicitly stated but can be discerned from the situation.101  Article 63 
additionally defines defamation as any allegation or imputation against a public figure that the 
alleged defamer knows to be false and distributes with a malicious intent.102
The legality of the UNTAC provision will be analyzed from several perspectives:  the 
Cambodian Constitution, the treaties Cambodia has signed, as well as customary international 
law.  When analyzing the legality of a domestic law, one should first analyze the provision under 
the country’s constitution and then under international standards.  Cambodia’s Constitution 
guarantees freedom of expression— so long as it does not violate the rights of others.103  Article 
63 is also in violation of international standards because it (1) violates international treaties and 
(2) violates international custom because many countries are decriminalizing their defamation 
laws.104  International courts have found that criminal defamation laws violate freedom of 
expression because they mandate a punishment disproportionate to the crime.105  Additionally, 
criminal defamation laws are not a proper remedy because it is the damage done to the 
individual’s reputation that must be repaired.  The focus should be on the victim’s restitution.106
Cambodia’s Constitution
The Constitution of the Kingdom of Cambodia was adopted September 21, 1993 by the 
Constitutional Assembly in Phnom Penh.  It establishes the structure of the government and 
guarantees specific human rights to its citizens.  The preamble proclaims that its goal is to 
“restore Cambodia into an ‘Island of Peace’ based on a multi-party liberal democratic regime 
guaranteeing human rights.”107  Similarly, Article 31 of the Cambodian Constitution recognizes 
and respects the human rights of the United Nations Charter, the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights as well as the covenants and conventions related to human rights.  
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The Cambodian Constitution recognizes in Article 41 the rights of Khmer citizens to the 
freedom of expression.  However “no one shall exercise this right to infringe upon the rights of 
others, to effect the good traditions of society or violate public law and order and national 
security.”108  Cambodia’s Constitution does not grant its citizens an unqualified right to freedom 
of speech like the United States Constitution does.  Cambodia’s Constitution qualifies this right 
like many other countries’ constitutions that do not have such an unqualified right.109  Case law 
demonstrates the balancing act between the need for freedom of expression and the rights of the 
individual for recourse when defamation occurs.110  It is essential that this balance be applied 
appropriately.  The law cannot be abused by the government as a method for eradicating Khmer 
citizens’ rights to freedom of expression.  Furthermore, Article 150 of the Cambodian 
Constitution stipulates that the Constitution is the supreme law of the land and that all laws must 
be in strict conformity with the Constitution.  Cambodia’s Constitution requires that all Khmer 
laws, in order to conform to the Constitution, respect the rights of freedom of expression under 
Article 41 by balancing that right with the rights of other citizens, namely the rights of citizens to 
protect their reputations from defamatory statements.
Sources of International Law
International law is an important guide in analyzing whether a domestic law violates the 
human rights of the country’s citizens because it represents international standards.  These 
standards are reflected in multi-lateral treaties, customary international law, general principles of 
law as well as decisions by international judicial bodies and academic work.  
Article 38 of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) defines sources of international 
law.111  First, the court is to apply international conventions, recognized by the contesting states; 
second, the court is to apply international custom, evidenced by the a general practice being 
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accepted as law; third, the court is to look at general principles of law recognized by civil 
nations, and, lastly, the court is to turn to previous judicial decisions and scholarly works as 
subsidiary means for determining the law.112  These sources of law are reflective for international 
scholars evaluating the legality of national laws.  
Treaties
Defamation law chills free speech as it discourages public statements against another 
individual.113  Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights mandates 
that, “Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference and the right to 
freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information 
and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers.”114  This right, however, is subject to certain 
restrictions, but only those that are required to “respect the rights and reputations of others”115
and “for the protection of national security or of public order, or of public health or morals.”116
The ICCPR’s limitations are reflected in legal systems worldwide—specifically, in civil 
defamation laws, where malicious untrue statements are not tolerated but public discourse is 
promoted.  
Problems of enforceability arise with human rights treaties because states have little 
incentive to abide by treaties they ratify.  The Optional Protocol to the ICCPR117 (“First Optional 
Protocol”) creates an enforcement mechanism by allowing individuals to bring claims against 
their own government to the United Nations Human Rights Committee (UNHRC) in Geneva.  
Any claims brought to the UNHRC must arise out of the state’s violation of rights guaranteed by 
the ICCPR.  Thus, within the context of Cambodia’s criminal defamation laws, an individual 
could bring a claim against the state of Cambodia if the state were violating his or her right to 
freedom of expression which is preserved by Article 19 of the ICCPR.
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International Practice
International practice is an important barometer of customary international law.  It 
demonstrates the norms as well as different approaches depending on the structure of a state’s 
constitution with the differing rights constitutions guarantee.
The United States Constitution provides an unabridged right to the freedom of speech in 
its First Amendment.  In New York Times v. Sullivan, the United States Supreme Court held that 
in order to protect constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech, an individual cannot sue for 
defamation for statements made about his public duties in a public role unless the statement was 
made with actual malice.118  The Court defined actual malice as knowledge that the statement 
was false or with reckless disregard for the truth. 119  This actual malice standard is one of the 
most stringent standards because it places a very high burden on the plaintiff when the defendant 
was speaking about an issue of public concern.120  However, many other countries that do not 
have this unabridged right to freedom of speech, like the European Convention for the Protection 
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,121 have subscribed to the balancing test described 
within this comment as a guide to analyzing the legality of defamation laws.  
Criminal defamation is contrary to international human rights law as adjudicated in major 
human rights institutions like the ECHR and the Inter-American Court.  The ECHR has held that 
this inquiry focuses on whether this state interference of free expression was proportionate to the 
legitimate aim of protecting an individual’s reputation in Lingens v. Austria.122 The court 
reaffirmed this holding in Castells v. Spain.  In Lingens, a journalist alleged in a magazine article 
that the head of the state socialist party had been involved in accommodating Nazis.  The 
journalist was subsequently convicted of criminal defamation.123  The defendant in Castells was 
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a senator who alleged that the Spanish government had murdered many Basque separatists. 124
He was eventually found guilty of criminal defamation.
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights recently addressed this issue.  In July of 
2004, the Inter-American Court reversed a criminal sentence against a journalist for a Costa 
Rican paper, La Nación.125  The reporter, Mauricio Herrera Ulloa, cited European papers 
alleging the corruption of a Costa Rican diplomat.  A Costa Rican court convicted him of 
criminal defamation.  
A Paraguayan criminal defamation conviction of former presidential candidate Ricardo 
Canese was also reversed by the Inter-American Court in August of that same year.126  Canese 
made statements to the press questioning connections between his opponent and the country’s 
former dictator.  Canese was convicted of criminal defamation; he was sentenced to four months 
in prison and fined US $7,500.127 The court reversed the conviction because it impermissibly
violated his rights under the American Convention of Human Rights.
Furthermore, there is a growing international trend toward denying the government legal 
standing in civil defamation cases.  The UN Committee on Human Rights stated called for the 
abolition of standing for the government, finding it a deplorable offense.128  Recent examples 
include decisions by the English House of Lords,129 the Indian Supreme Court,130 the Supreme
Court of South Africa,131 and the Supreme Court of Zimbabwe.132  These courts have articulated 
three main rationales for the denial of standing to governmental bodies:  (1)  the importance of 
vigorous public discourse and the chilling effect of defamation suits; (2) defamation laws are to 
protect reputational interests and governments by their nature cannot have a reputation because a 
government is not a person; and (3) it is an inappropriate use of taxpayer money to allow the 
government to use that money to repress the taxpayers’ right to freedom of expression.133  This is 
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a very creative solution as it satisfies several very important concerns: it allows civil defamation 
suits as recourse to damage done to one’s reputation while protecting public debate, a primary 
concern with freedom of expression issues and preventing governmental abuse of defamation 
laws.
LEGAL PROBLEM
The United Nations Transitory Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) instituted a number of 
laws that were designed to be transitory, much like the authority itself.  Cambodia’s current laws 
read like a patchwork quilt:  some new laws have been passed by the legislature that should 
overrule the UNTAC laws while other UNTAC laws remain good law today.  The result is a 
dizzying confusion for anyone trying to adhere to Cambodian law in any arena from land laws to 
criminal procedure.  
Criminal defamation laws like Article 63 dangerously inhibit public discourse.  Penal 
detention is not an appropriate remedy for damage to one’s reputation.  Civil defamation laws 
adequately ensure the state’s interest in protecting the reputational rights of its citizens.  A 
democracy’s survival is predicated upon this freedom of expression and the ability of individuals 
to criticize their own government when they have legitimate reasons to do so.  A criminal 
defamation law is a dangerous weapon that can be improperly pointed by a government at its 
opponents.    This abuse of the criminal defamation law hinders the road to democracy.
ANALYSIS
The Cambodian Constitution guarantees the right to freedom of expression.  UNTAC 
Article 63 improperly violates that right.  In order to effectuate this right to freedom of 
expression, the UNTAC law of criminal defamation must be abolished.
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The Cambodian Constitution has a separate provision mandating that all laws must be in 
strict conformity with the constitution, further emphasizing the importance of the constitutional 
kram (the Khmer word for laws promulgated by the Parliament).  Article 63 was written before 
the Cambodian Constitution was created.  The UNTAC law, by criminalizing defamation, is 
incompatible with the Cambodian Constitution’s guarantees of free expression.  Article 31 of the 
Cambodian Constitution requires that the rights of the individual to free speech be balanced with 
the rights of others, as one cannot be accommodated by violating another.  However, the criminal 
punishment of one who defames another tips this scale, it impermissibly encumbers one’s 
freedom of expression.  There cannot be freedom of expression when a speaker can be jailed for 
voicing his opinion.  A balance must be found to ensure that Khmer citizens are free to comment 
on the actions of the government without being taken to jail without bail as many recently have 
been.  A civil defamation law is the only way that a defamation law can respect the rights 
guaranteed in Article 41 of the Cambodian Constitution.
Treaties
The Government of Cambodia acceded to the ICCPR on May 26, 1992.134  Cambodia 
made no reservations to the treaty.135  As a result of Cambodia’s accession, Cambodia is bound 
by the treaty and accordingly is required to perform its obligations in good faith.136  The ICCPR 
guarantees the right to freedom of expression.  The Cambodian government has the obligation to 
respect that in addition to its own obligation to do so under its own Constitution.  If Cambodia 
does not fulfill that obligation, it will be in violation of the treaty.137
The first optional protocol provides a strong incentive for countries to abide by the 
obligations agreed to in the treaty because it allows  individuals to bring claims to the UNHRC 
when they have exhausted all available domestic remedies.  However states are only bound if 
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they specifically sign the optional protocol.  Cambodia signed the optional protocol on 
September 27, 2004.138  By signing this protocol, Cambodian individuals may now bring claims 
to the UNHRC alleging violations of the ICCPR by its government after they have exhausted all 
domestic remedies or when the individual’s access to that remedy has been unreasonably 
prolonged.139  The ability of this external body to be able to judge Cambodian laws and decisions 
by its judiciary should provide strong encouragement for the government to ensure its laws are in 
accord with the ICCPR.  
Cambodia has an obligation to protect the freedom of expression of its citizens and may 
only restrict that right in order to protect legitimate reputational interests.  Though the 
government argues to the contrary, protecting Cambodia’s political interests is not within this 
scope.  Criminal defamation laws are disproportionately punitive and accordingly violate the 
ICCPR’s mandate that freedom of expression be protected.  Defamation laws are only acceptable 
where they are the least restrictive means necessary to protect the reputational interests of 
individuals, not governments.  A civil defamation law is the only way to achieve that balance.
Customary International Law
The international system has no central lawmaking body, as a result one must turn to 
customary international law or general practice that is accepted as law.  Customary international 
law demonstrates the typical way states resolve a problem.  There is no analogy to this in 
domestic systems.  Elements of customary international law include state practice and opinio 
juris.140  Showing state practice requires demonstrating what states generally do, how states have 
responded.  Opinio juris is the obligation a state feels to behave in a certain way, that a state 
believes a certain response would be the correct legal response.141  It usually arises from 
consistent state practices in response to a certain issue.
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Customary international law in the human rights field is slightly different.  The nature of 
human rights violations mandates this difference.  This is because states generally do not bring 
claims against other states for internal human rights violations unless it affects their own 
nationals.142  In looking for practice and opinio juris one must turn to the international forums 
that deal with human rights concerns.143  It is in these forums that the issues are argued and 
debated, it is here where the issues are resolved.  By evaluating the position these forums have 
taken, one can assess whether the right has become part of customary international law.144
Application of Customary International Law to Defamation Laws
Freedom of expression is a right recognized by the ICCPR, a treaty which binds 155 
parties.145  Article 19 is now considered part of customary international law.146  In analyzing 
defamation laws, a balancing test best incorporates the competing rights to freedom of 
expression as well as the rights of an individual to protect his or her reputation.147  Widespread 
inclusion in national law and a general recognition of its international significance is one 
indication that a certain approach has become customary international law.148
The ECHR adopted the balancing test in Lingens.  It continued to use this balancing test 
in subsequent cases, such as Castells.  In Lingens, the ECHR emphasized that greater deference 
must be afforded to freedom of expression when the speech concerns political controversy.149
The court held that any interference with one’s freedom of expression by the state in the name of 
protecting individual reputation must be proportionately necessary in a democratic society.150
Defamation laws must reflect a balance between the right to freedom of expression and the right 
to reputation.  The court stressed that freedom of expression “constitutes one of the essential 
foundations of a democratic society and one of the basic conditions for its progress and for each 
individual’s self-fulfillment.”151  A state cannot impose unduly harsh penalties as it violates 
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one’s right to freedom of expression.152  The ECHR, however, has been unwilling to reject all 
criminal defamations, viewing it as an issue of state sovereignty.  Nonetheless, using the 
ECHR’s own test, criminal defamation laws will generally fail the Lingens test as unnecessary in 
a democratic society where there is a high premium on public discourse.
The Inter-American Court has also found criminal defamation laws to impermissibly 
restrict freedom of expression.  In reaching its decision in Herrera Ulloa, the Inter-American 
Court focused on the need for public debate rather than the protection of public officials.153  The 
Court mandated that Costa Rica amend its domestic defamation laws to conform with the 
American Convention on Human Rights’ guarantee of freedom of expression.154 The Inter-
American Court clearly embraced the importance of freedom of expression in its ruling on this 
case of first impression.
In Canese, the Inter-American Court held that the defendant’s criminal defamation 
conviction violated the rights embodied in Articles 13 (Right to Freedom of Thought and 
Expression) and that the state of Paraguay failed to comply with the obligation established in 
Article 1(1) (Obligation to Respect Rights).155  The Court additionally commented that 
Paraguay’s criminal defamation law violated international law.156
In sum, these cases, augmented by scholarly work on the topic, demonstrate the 
contemporary international view that criminal defamation laws are incompatible with a qualified 
right of freedom of expression.  Criminal defamation is too extreme of a punishment and upsets 
the balance between this interest in freedom of expression and the state’s interest in protecting an 
individual’s reputation.
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PROPOSAL
The Cambodian Parliament must pass a new defamation law that reflects the rights 
enshrined in Cambodia’s Constitution.  The criminal defamation law must be repealed.  This new 
law must be a civil defamation law in order to conform with Cambodia’s obligations under the 
international treaties it has ratified and conforms to customary international law.  In order to 
protect Khmer citizens’ rights to freedom of expression, it is vital to strike a proper balance 
between freedom of expression and to the right to protect one’s reputation by establishing a 
recourse for those who have been unfairly defamed.  Criminal defamation laws therefore have no 
place in a democracy because they burden the right to freedom of expression too heavily.  
Additionally, a civil defamation law must not allow the government to have standing to bring a 
suit in order to prevent the abuse of civil defamation laws.157  This is especially important in 
Cambodia where the judiciary is not independent and functions as an arm of the executive.
If Cambodia’s defamation laws do not change, individuals who have been convicted 
under Article 63 can bring a claim to the UNHRC after exhausting all domestic remedies.  
Following conviction at the trial court level, the defendant would need to pursue an appeal.  If 
the higher courts either refuse to take the case on appeal or there is an unreasonable delay in 
issuing a decision, the defendant can then appeal his conviction to the UNHRC under the First 
Optional Protocol to the ICCPR.158  This is an extreme legal remedy because it requires one to go 
beyond the Cambodian legal system and petition an international forum to accept the case.
The Constitutional Council interprets the constitutionality of laws.  If the Council 
somehow finds this law to be constitutional, while the author of this comment proposes it is
unconstitutional in light of the guarantees established in Article 41, an individual could bring a 
claim to the UNHRC alleging that Article 63 violates Cambodia’s treaty obligations.  The 
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UNHRC would then have to accept the case and issue a decision on the legality of Article 63 
under the ICCPR.
CONCLUSION
Criminal defamation laws have no place in a country that guarantees freedom of 
expression.  UNTAC Article 63 was designed to be a transitional law yet it remains part of 
Cambodia’s current laws.  It must be abolished, as Article 150 of the Cambodian Constitution 
requires the abolition of any unconstitutional restriction on human rights.  Cambodians like Kem 
Sokha have felt its effects as has Cambodian society in a country where freedom of speech is 
already so repressed that people only discuss politics with their families and closest friends in the 
privacy of one’s home.  The purpose of this comment is to draw attention to the gap between 
Cambodia’s Constitution, its treaty obligations under the ICCPR, customary international law,
and UNTAC Article 63.  A new constitutional law must be passed and that law must be a civil 
defamation law given Article 41’s guarantee of freedom of expression.  Furthermore, to 
safeguard against potential abuses of the civil law and encourage public discourse, the law must 
deny standing to the government in defamation suits.
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